The Essential Religious Practices (ERP) test is a doctrine used by Indian courts to determine if a religious practice is “essential and integral” to a religion. Only practices that pass this test receive constitutional protection under Articles 25 and 26, which guarantee religious freedom, subject to public order, morality, and health.
Under this doctrine, only those practices considered fundamental, integral or essential to a religion receive protection. Peripheral, optional or superstitious practices may be regulated by the State.
Broadly, the ERP may be defined as core beliefs and practices upon which a religion is founded. Although the term “religious practice” appears in Article 25(2)(a), the prefix ‘essential’ is not there. The Constitution neither employs nor defines the word essential.

Evolution

In the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Shri Lakshmindar Tirtha Swamiyar of Shri Shirur Mutt, 1954(Shirur Mutt case) the court held that a religious denomination or organisation, under Article 26(b), enjoys “complete autonomy” in deciding what constituted “essential” aspects of religion.
In the Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (1958), the court moved away from the “complete autonomy” aspect, and firmly established the role of the court in determining the “essential” practice of religion.
In Mohd. Hanif Qureshi (1959), the Court went into the interpretation of the Islamic texts to conclude that the sacrifice of a cow at Bakr-Id was not an obligatory religious act, and therefore not an essential practice under Article 25.
In the Durgah Committee, Ajmer v Syed Hussain Ali (1961), the Supreme Court attempted to distinguish between genuine religious practice and “superstitious beliefs”. It held that all practices characterised as “superstitious beliefs” and “extraneous accretions” would not be afforded constitutional protection.
In the Sardar Syedna Taher Saiffuddin Saheb v State of Bombay (1962) case, the Supreme Court held that essential practices are to be determined through texts and tenets of the religion. It also clarified that Article 25 did not permit the legislature to “reform” a religion “out of existence” entirely. \
In the Commissioner of Police v Acharya Jagadisharananda Avadhuta(1984) , a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that the Tandava dance was not an ERP of the Ananda Marga denomination as it was introduced only in 1966.
- It said that the faith had come into existence in 1955, while the tandava dance was adopted only in 1966 — therefore, as the faith had existed without the practice, the practice could not be accepted as an essential feature of the faith.
In the Commissioner of Police v Acharya Jagadisharananda Avadhuta (2004), the Supreme Court put forward a test for ERP by asking whether or not the absence of a particular practice would fundamentally alter the character of that religion (The Supreme Court also reaffirmed its earlier stance from the 1984 judgment (Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police) that the performance of Tandava dance in public is not an essential and integral part of the Ananda Marga faith).
- Applying this test in the landmark Shayara Bano case (2017), the apex court held that triple talaq would not form part of any essential religious practice as its absence would not change the fundamental nature of Islam.
Dr Mahesh Vijay Bedekar v Maharashtra(2016), the Bombay High court had ruled that the “use of loudspeakers is not an essential part of any religion”. The use of loudspeakers could not be claimed as a fundamental right under Article 25 (freedom of religion) and Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) of the Constitution

Significance of the ERP Doctrine

Determines the Protected Core of Religion
- The doctrine identifies which practices are so fundamental to a religion that their removal would alter its essential character. Such practices receive protection under Articles 25 and 26.
Defines the Boundary of State Intervention
- Once a practice is held to be essential and religious, the State ordinarily cannot interfere with it except on the grounds of public order, morality, health and other applicable constitutional limitations.
Prevents Automatic Constitutional Protection
- Merely describing a practice as religious does not make it constitutionally protected. The ERP doctrine prevents every custom, tradition or activity associated with religion from claiming immunity from regulation.
Separates Essential Practices from Extraneous Accretions
- It helps courts distinguish the core tenets of a religion from practices that may have developed subsequently as optional, superstitious or non-essential additions.
Distinguishes Religious Affairs from Secular Activities
- The doctrine helps determine whether an activity concerns an essential matter of faith or is merely an economic, financial, administrative or political activity associated with religion. The latter can be regulated by the State.
Determines the Scope of Denominational Autonomy
- Under Article 26(b), a religious denomination can independently manage its affairs in matters of religion. The ERP doctrine helps identify which affairs fall within this protected religious domain.
Checks Strategic Use of Religious Claims
- The doctrine prevents individuals or organisations from shielding otherwise regulable conduct merely by presenting it as indispensable to their religion.
  - Without some judicial capacity to examine the essentiality of a claimed practice, Article 25 would become a blank cheque; any practice, however harmful or discriminatory, could claim constitutional immunity simply by being wrapped in religious garb.
Reducing the State’s Burden of Justification
- Under the explicit text of Articles 25 and 26, state intervention in religious practices is permitted only if those practices violate public order, morality, health etc.. Proving that a regulatory law meets these high thresholds places a massive burden of justification on the state—one that many everyday administrative or regulatory laws struggle to satisfy. The ERP test bypasses this requirement; if the Court decides a practice is not “essential,” the state does not have to meet the heavy burden of proving a threat to public order or morality to regulate it
A Tool for State-led Social Reform and “Purging”
- The ERP doctrine has become the primary jurisprudential vehicle for the judiciary to drive social progress, enforce gender equality, and dismantle regressive practices.
  - It was used in Shayara Bano to delegitimize triple talaq as non-essential to Islam, and in the Sabarimala case to strike down the exclusion of women of menstruating age.
  - In the Durgah Committee case, the Supreme Court denied validity to practices that had “sprung from merely superstitious beliefs” and therefore could be considered as “extraneous and unessential accretions to religion”
  - Other prominent decisions include the banning of animal sacrifice in temples(Ramesh Sharma v State of H.P. 2014 ) & facilitating the appointment of non-Brahmins as temple priests (N. Adithayan v Travancore Devaswom Board 1995 )

Criticisms

Courts Acting as Religious Authorities
- The doctrine requires judges to interpret scriptures and determine the essential elements of a religion, effectively turning constitutional courts into theological authorities.
Undermining Religious Autonomy and Normative Pluralism
- Under the Essential Religious Practices (ERP) doctrine, the Supreme Court does not just decide if a religious practice violates public laws; instead, it acts as an “external theologian” (a religious scholar) to decide what is “true” or “essential” to a religion. By doing this, the Court invades the internal autonomy of religious groups to define themselves
Absence of Explicit Constitutional Basis
- Articles 25 and 26 protect religious beliefs and practices but do not state that only practices considered “essential” deserve protection. The test is a judicial innovation.
Restricts the Scope of Religious Freedom
- Once a practice is classified as non-essential, it may lose constitutional protection even when it represents a sincerely held religious belief.
Inconsistent Application
- Courts have relied variously on religious texts, antiquity, community opinion, obligatory character and the consequences of removing a practice. The absence of a uniform test produces unpredictable decisions.
Excessive Reliance on Religious Texts
- The Court has a heavy scriptural bias, meaning it relies almost entirely on classical, written, and foundational texts (like the Vedas or Dharma Shastras) as “proof” of whether a practice is essential. This severely disadvantages smaller, regional, or animist sects that do not have a central “sacred book” and instead keep their traditions alive through oral storytelling. Requiring ancient written proof marginalizes these oral, localized, and newly evolving traditions in several ways
  - The Cobra Worship Case (Gram Sabha, 2014): The Bombay High Court rejected a localized ritual of worshiping live cobras because it was not mentioned in mainstream, classical Dharma Shastras. In doing so, the Court completely ignored a local written text (Shrinath Lilamrut) and wiped out the legitimate cultural variations within Hinduism
  - The Sabarimala Case (Young Lawyers Association, 2018): Instead of evaluating the specific beliefs of Ayyappa devotees according to their own South Indian cultural framework, the Court evaluated the temple’s practices against a monolithic, mainstream understanding of “Hindus”. By demanding textual scriptural proof to justify the deity’s celibate traditions, the Court marginalized the localized oral traditions of the devotees
Neglects Individual Freedom of Conscience
- Article 25 protects individual conscience, but the ERP test generally asks whether a practice is compulsory for the entire religious community rather than whether it is sincerely important to an individual.
Freezes Religion in Time
- The emphasis on antiquity and historical continuity treats religion as static and may deny protection to practices that have emerged through genuine religious evolution.
Disregarding the Dynamic Nature of Religions
- The ERP doctrine is based on the false assumption that religions are static, rigid systems frozen in time. In reality, religious systems are constantly changing and evolving. Historically, religions have reformed themselves naturally from within through internal debates —such as Hinduism evolving to reject the practice of sati. When the Court acts as a quasi-religious authority and dictates what is “essential,” it shuts down the organic space for communities to reflect, debate, and reform their own traditions
Privileges Dominant Interpretations
- Courts may accept the views of established religious authorities and overlook reformist groups, minority sects and internal diversity within a religion.
All-or-Nothing Protection
- A practice classified as essential receives strong protection, while a non-essential practice may receive little protection. This binary approach leaves inadequate room for proportional balancing.
Enables Easier State Interference
- Once a practice is declared non-essential, the State may regulate it without having to establish a compelling threat to public order, morality or health.
Subjective Judicial Determination
- Terms such as “essential,” “integral” and “fundamental” lack precise legal definitions, allowing the personal values and understanding of judges to influence adjudication.
Imposing “Outsider” Biases and Causing Cultural Coercion
- Judges are complete “outsiders” to the specific, localized religious sects they are judging. Like anyone else, judges carry their own subconscious “common sense”—a personal cultural framework of values, colloquial wisdom, and assessments shaped by their own social environment. When judges use their personal “common sense” to decide what is core to a completely different cultural or religious group, it results in cultural coercion. This forces smaller, localized, or minority groups to assimilate into the majority’s cultural standards
Confuses Religious and Constitutional Questions
- Instead of examining whether a restriction is lawful and proportionate, courts often focus on whether the contested practice is theologically indispensable.
Potential for Excessive Judicial Reformism
- Conversely, declaring contested practices non-essential may allow courts to reshape religion according to external constitutional or rational standards without adequate sensitivity to believers’ perspectives.

How does essentiality square up against religious freedom?

Freedom of religion is meant to guarantee freedom to practice one’s beliefs based on the concept of “inward association” of man with God.
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay (1954): The Supreme Court recognised that every person has the right to hold religious beliefs approved by their own judgment or conscience. Articles 25 and 26 were intended to protect this individual autonomy.
Essentiality Restricts Individual Choice
- The ERP doctrine protects a practice only when courts consider it essential to the religion. Therefore, a sincerely held religious belief may remain unprotected merely because it is not mandatory for all followers.
  - Scholars such as Prof Mustafa have argued that the essentiality test impinges on individual autonomy.
Court’s Determination Replaces Personal Conscience
- Instead of asking whether an individual genuinely considers the practice important to their faith, the doctrine allows judges to decide its theological significance. This may undermine the autonomy that religious freedom seeks to guarantee.
Thus, essentiality and religious freedom do not always sit comfortably together: religious freedom protects an individual’s conscience, whereas the ERP doctrine protects only those practices that courts recognise as indispensable to a religion.

Can Courts Act as Theological Arbiters?

Judicial intervention has helped determine whether practices claiming constitutional protection are genuinely religious. However, it has also generated serious concerns.

Lack of Religious Expertise: Secular courts may not possess the theological knowledge required to classify a belief as genuine, superstitious or essential.
Judicial Subjectivity: What appears irrational or superstitious to a judge may be sacred to a religious community.
Interference with Religious Autonomy: Judicial determination of essentiality may replace the community’s understanding of its own religion.
Legislative Domain: It is argued that Article 25(2) authorises the legislature to regulate secular activities and undertake social reform; courts should not independently reform religious doctrine.

Way Forward

Reverting to Original Constitutional Limitations
- Instead of trying to decide what is “essential” to a religion, the Court should consider abandoning the ERP test entirely and return to the literal text of the Constitution. Under Article 25, religious freedom is protected but strictly limited by public order, morality, health, and other fundamental rights. If a practice violates these specific public standards, the Court can strike it down directly. This allows the State to carry out social reforms without having to pretend to be a religious scholar or redefine a group’s theology
Shift Toward the “Constitutional Morality” / Anti-Exclusion Framework /Harm
- Move away from a purely theological inquiry (what is doctrinally essential) toward asking whether a practice violates constitutional values of equality, dignity, and non-exclusion (Sabarimala Case) — reduces courts’ burden of acting as theological arbiters
- Adopting the “Anti-Exclusion Principle” : Another legal alternative is the “anti-exclusion principle” proposed by legal scholar Gautam Bhatia. Under this rule, the Court would only step in if a religious practice actively blocks an individual from accessing basic public goods required for a life of dignity—such as denying a group entry into a temple, or blocking access to education and employment. This principle protects the rights and dignity of marginalized individuals while preserving the internal, doctrinal freedom of the religious community.
- Shift from Essentiality to Harm: Instead of deciding whether a practice is indispensable to a religion, courts should primarily examine whether it causes tangible harm, violates public order or infringes the fundamental rights of others.
Clear and Inclusive Judicial Test
- The Supreme Court should formulate an objective test that clearly distinguishes core religious practices from secular activities, while giving due importance to individual conscience
- This would reduce inconsistent court decisions and excessive judicial interference in religious matters.
Exercise judicial restraint
- Courts should avoid interpreting theology or determining the spiritual correctness of beliefs.
Encourage internal reform
- Dialogue and reform from within communities can produce more legitimate and durable change than exclusively court-driven intervention.
Protect Individual Conscience
- The doctrine should give greater importance to the religious freedom of individual believers instead of giving priority only to the claims of religious institutions or denominations.
Recognise Internal Religious Diversity
- Courts should consult different denominations, scholars, practitioners and affected groups instead of treating the views of dominant religious authorities as representing the entire community.
Avoid Freezing Religion in Time
- A practice should not be rejected merely because it is recent. Courts should recognise that religions and their modes of expression can evolve with society.

The Essential Religious Practices doctrine was developed to protect the core of religious freedom while allowing regulation of secular and harmful activities. However, its application has often transformed constitutional courts into interpreters of theology. The future approach should move from asking only whether a practice is “essential to religion” towards examining whether it is sincerely religious, causes demonstrable harm and is compatible with equal citizenship. This would better reconcile India’s religious pluralism with the Constitution’s transformative commitment to liberty, equality, dignity and social reform.

Sample Mains Question

1What is the Essential Religious Practices doctrine? Explain its significance and major criticisms. (150 Words, 10 Marks)

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