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Governor: Issues, Controversies, Supreme Court Cases and Reforms

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Governor: Issues, Controversies, Supreme Court Cases and Reforms

Governor: Issues, Controversies, Supreme Court Cases and Reforms

The office of Governor occupies one of the most constitutionally ambiguous and politically contested positions in India’s federal architecture — simultaneously the constitutional head of state government, the centre’s representative in the state, and a functionary whose discretionary powers have been systematically exploited to serve partisan political interests at the expense of federal principles, democratic legitimacy, and constitutional propriety. Designed as a dignified constitutional office that would maintain constitutional governance in states while serving as a neutral link between centre and state, the Governor has in practice frequently become the most visible instrument of central interference in state governance — an appointed official whose partisan deployment has generated more constitutional litigation, more federal tension, and more democratic controversy than almost any other constitutional office.

Issues with the Office of Governor

Appointment Issues
- Politicisation of Appointments
  - The central executive exercises unilateral control over the appointment of Governors, often leading to the selection of individuals with strong political affiliations, which erodes the office’s credibility
  - Individuals with recent and active political affiliations have been appointed as Governors, creating doubts about their ability to function impartially when a different political party governs the State.
    - Successive central governments have appointed party loyalists, retired politicians, former civil servants with known political affiliations, and persons with personal connections to the ruling party.
- Weak Federal Participation in Selection
  - The elected State government has no formal role in selecting the Governor who will serve as its constitutional head.
  - This strengthens the perception that the Governor represents the Union government rather than the constitutional interests of the State.
  - Lack of consultation also reduces the State government’s confidence in the neutrality of the appointee.
Insecurity of Tenure
- Although Article 156 provides a five-year term, the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President and can be removed or transferred before completion of the term.
- Chilling effect — Governors knowing their tenure depends on central government’s satisfaction — moderating their conduct to avoid displeasing the centre. Constitutional discretion exercised with one eye on career security — independence compromised by tenure insecurity before any specific discretionary decision is made.
- Dependence on the Union government for continuation in office can weaken the Governor’s institutional independence.
  - Mass removals — pattern of new governments removing Governors appointed by predecessor
    - 1977 Janata government removing Congress-appointed Governors, 1980 Congress returning the favour, 2004 UPA removing NDA-appointed Governors, 2014 NDA removing UPA-appointed Governors — each government treating gubernatorial appointments as political patronage to be redistributed on assumption of office.
Perception as an Agent of the Union Government
- The Governor performs the dual role of constitutional head of the State and representative of the Union.
- When the Union and State are governed by rival political parties, this dual position frequently produces mistrust and institutional confrontation.
- Reports, public statements and discretionary decisions of Governors are therefore often viewed through a partisan lens.
  - West Bengal (2024) — Governor’s comments on state policies criticised as overreach.
Discretion in Government Formation
- In a hung Assembly, the Governor decides whom to invite to form the government.
- Absence of binding constitutional rules regarding the order of preference creates scope for inconsistent decisions.
- Invitation to a pre-poll alliance, post-poll coalition or the single largest party can significantly influence the eventual government formation.
- The time granted to prove majority can also affect political bargaining and defections.
  - Partisan invitation — Governors consistently inviting party aligned with centre — even when it lacks a clear majority — over larger pre-poll or post-poll alliances. Goa 2017, Manipur 2017, Karnataka 2018 — pattern of centre-aligned parties being invited despite not being largest party — Governor exercising discretion in centre’s political interest.
    - Karnataka 2018 — most judicially examined case — Governor inviting BJP despite Congress-JD(S) having post-poll majority
Controversial Use of Floor Tests
- A Governor can require a government to prove its majority where objective material creates genuine doubt regarding legislative confidence.
- Governors refusing to order floor test when opposition demands it — protecting governments whose majority is questionable — or precipitating floor test when ruling government faces challenge — discretion exercised to serve political convenience rather than constitutional propriety.
- Floor tests ordered on the basis of internal party disputes, political claims or unverified communications can destabilise an elected government.
  - In the Maharashtra political crisis judgment, 2023, the Supreme Court held that the Governor did not possess objective material sufficient to conclude that the government had lost the confidence of the House and that calling the floor test was unjustified
Interference in Legislative Sessions
- The Governor’s constitutional powers relating to summoning, proroguing and addressing the legislature are ordinarily exercised on ministerial advice.
- Unilateral intervention in the timing or agenda of an Assembly session can interfere with the functioning of an elected government.
  - Nabam Rebia 2016 — Arunachal Pradesh — Governor advancing assembly session — allowing rebel Congress MLAs to remove Speaker.
  - In Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, 2016, the Supreme Court invalidated the Governor’s unilateral decision to advance the Arunachal Pradesh Assembly session and determine its agenda
Delay in Assent to State Bills
- Article 200 — Governor may assent, withhold assent, or reserve bill for President — withholding assent returning bill to legislature — reservation sending bill to President’s consideration. These powers — designed as constitutional checks — increasingly used as political weapons against opposition-ruled states.
- Governors have kept Bills passed by State Legislatures pending for prolonged periods without granting assent, returning them or reserving them for presidential consideration.
  - Punjab, Kerala, Telangana pattern — opposition-ruled states — Governors withholding assent to bills on education, health, local governance — creating legislative paralysis in states. Bills democratically passed by elected state legislatures — effectively vetoed by centrally appointed Governors — democratic mandate frustrated.
  - Tamil Nadu (2023) — Governor withheld assent to 10 bills, referred re-enacted bills to President, ruled “erroneous” by SC
  - Kerala (2024) — The Governor delayed assent to Lokayukta and University Amendment Bills
- Such inaction creates a form of pocket veto, frustrating the legislative mandate of the elected State government.
- The absence of constitutionally prescribed timelines has contributed to repeated litigation involving Bills passed by State Legislatures.
Reservation of Bills for Presidential Consideration
- Governors reserving bills for the President’s consideration — on grounds that the bill conflicts with central legislation or constitutional provisions — sometimes justified but increasingly used to delay or effectively veto state legislation on politically inconvenient subjects.
President’s Rule Recommendation — Article 356 Misuse
- Article 356 — Governor recommending President’s Rule when satisfied that state government cannot be carried on in accordance with Constitution — most consequential power — enabling dismissal of elected state government.
- Partisan, speculative or inadequately verified reports can enable the Union to dismiss an elected State government.
- Historical misuse — pre-S.R. Bommai — Governor’s reports to President — based on political assessment rather than constitutional analysis — recommending President’s Rule to remove inconvenient opposition governments.
- Post-Bommai constraints — S.R. Bommai 1994 — Supreme Court imposing judicial review on Article 356 — established the floor test as the mandatory way to test a government’s majority — significantly constraining misuse. But the Governor’s role in initiating the process — through partisan reporting — remains a federal vulnerability even after Bommai’s constraints on ultimate imposition.
  - Uttarakhand 2016 — Supreme Court restoring dismissed government — finding President’s Rule unjustified — Governor’s recommendation reflecting central political interest
Conflict in the Role of University Chancellor
- In many States, legislation designates the Governor as Chancellor of State universities.
- This is a statutory role rather than an inherent constitutional function of the Governor.
- Disputes over the appointment of Vice-Chancellors and constitution of search committees have produced institutional conflicts between Governors and elected State governments.
- In 2024, disagreement between the West Bengal government and the Governor-Chancellor had created a stalemate in the appointment of regular Vice-Chancellors.
Interference in Day-to-Day Governance
- Governors sometimes seek detailed administrative information, directly interact with officials or publicly criticise decisions of the elected government.
- While the Governor has the right to be informed, routine executive administration belongs to the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister.
Public Confrontation with the Elected Government
- Constitutional concerns should ordinarily be communicated through formal and confidential institutional channels.
- Frequent public criticism, political commentary or confrontation with the Chief Minister lowers the dignity and neutrality of the office.
  - Tamil Nadu Governor–Government Confrontation, 2023 — Governor R.N. Ravi omitted portions of the government-prepared address to the State Assembly.
Ordinance Misuse
- Re-promulgating ordinances to bypass legislature, undermining democracy
  - DC Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (1987) — SC condemned re-promulgation as a “fraud” on the Constitution.

Recommendations of Various Commissions on the Office of Governor

Sarkaria Commission (1988)
- Governors must not be removed before completion of their five year tenure, except in rare and compelling circumstances.
- The procedure of consulting the chief minister in the appointment of the state governor should be prescribed in the Constitution itself.
- The governor cannot dismiss the council of ministers so long as it commands a majority in the assembly.
- The governor's term of five years in a state should not be disturbed except for some extremely compelling reasons.
- The key recommendations for the appointment of Governors
  - The Governor should be eminent in some walk of life.
  - The Governor should be a person from outside the State.
  - The Governor should be a detached figure, not too involved in local politics.
  - The appointee should not have been too actively involved in politics, particularly in recent years.
  - A politician from the ruling party at the Union shouldn't be appointed as Governor in a State governed by another party or coalition.
Punchhi Commission (2010)
- While selecting Governors, the Central Government should adopt the following strict guidelines as recommended in the Sarkaria Commission report and follow its mandate in letter and spirit:
  - He/she should be eminent in some walk of life
  - He/she should be a person from outside the state
  - He/she should be a detached figure and not too intimately connected with the local politics of the state
  - He/she should be a person who has not taken too great a part in politics generally and particularly in the recent past
- Suggested that the phrase "during the pleasure of the President" should be deleted from the Constitution, because a Governor should not be removed at the will of the central government; instead he or she should be removed only by a resolution of the state legislature.
  - Governors should be given a fixed tenure of five years and their removal should not be at the sweet will of the Government at the Centre.
  - The procedure laid down for impeachment of the President, mutatis mutandis can be made applicable for impeachment of Governors as well.
- Article 163 does not give the Governor a general discretionary power to act against or without the advice of his/her Council of Ministers. In fact, the area for the exercise of discretion is limited and even in this limited area, his/her choice of action should not be arbitrary or fanciful. It must be a choice dictated by reason, activated by good faith and tempered by caution.
- In respect of bills passed by the Legislative Assembly of a state, the Governor should take the decision within six months whether to grant assent or to reserve it for consideration of the President.
- On the question of the Governor's role in appointment of Chief Minister in the case of a hung assembly, it is necessary to lay down certain clear guidelines to be followed as Constitutional conventions.
- Restriction of Governors' Non-Constitutional Roles — The Punchhi Commission proposed that Governors should no longer hold positions such as Chancellors of Universities or other statutory roles, with their responsibilities strictly limited to constitutional duties.
Venkatachaliah Commission (2002)
- Appointment by a Committee comprising the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Speaker of the Lok Sabha, and the Chief Minister of the State concerned.
- Ordinarily Governors should be allowed to complete their five year term. If they have to be removed before completion of their term, the central government should do so only after consultation with the Chief Minister.

Case Laws

Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, 2006
- Motivated and whimsical conduct of the Governor in recommending the president's rule falls under judicial review.
- The imposition of President's Rule under Article 356 should be exercised sparingly and with caution.
- The court pressed for a floor test to confirm the majority prior to recommending dissolution of the assembly.
- The court ruled that the power under Article 356 was not absolute. It should be based on objective material and grounded in circumstances well in tune with the spirit of the Constitution.
B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, 2010
- The President, in effect the central government, has the power to remove a Governor at any time without giving him or her any reason, and without granting an opportunity to be heard.
- However, this power cannot be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner. The power of removing Governors should only be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances for valid and compelling reasons.
- The mere reason that a Governor is at variance with the policies and ideologies of the central government, or that the central government has lost confidence in him or her, is not sufficient to remove a Governor.
Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, 2016
- The Governor cannot ordinarily summon, prorogue or advance a session of the Legislative Assembly without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
- The Governor also cannot independently determine the legislative agenda or direct how the House should conduct its proceedings.
- Article 163 does not confer an unrestricted or general discretionary power upon the Governor.
State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, 2025
- The Supreme Court (SC) of India, in the State of Tamil Nadu vs. Governor of Tamil Nadu, clarified that Governors must act on state bills in a time-bound manner, following the aid and advice of the council of ministers, as per Article 200, without independent discretion.
- The Court ruled that there is no concept of "absolute veto" or "pocket veto" under Article 200 and stated that governors cannot indefinitely delay action on bills.
- The SC prescribed clear timelines for Governors when dealing with Bills with one month to withhold assent, three months if doing against State Cabinet advice, and one month for Bills re-presented after reconsideration.
16th Presidential Reference
- The reference stemmed from the Court's ruling in State of Tamil Nadu vs Governor of Tamil Nadu (April 2025), which had introduced timelines for constitutional assent and deem assent for pending bills.
  - The Court held that neither a Governor (under Article 200) nor the President (under Article 201) is subject to fixed, court-imposed timelines for granting or withholding assent to bills, as doing so would amount to judicial overreach and violate the doctrine of Separation of Powers.
  - The Court clarified that Articles 200 and 201 contain no fixed timelines, and the phrase "as soon as possible" cannot be interpreted as a strict or enforceable deadline.
  - However, the SC held that "prolonged, unexplained, and indefinite inaction" can be reviewed by the judiciary, and in such cases the Court may direct the Governor to act, but without imposing a deadline or examining the merits of the decision.
  - 'Deemed Assent' is Unconstitutional: The Court firmly rejected the idea that a bill automatically becomes law ("deemed assent") simply because the Governor or President did not act within some timeframe.
    - The Court held that deemed assent has no constitutional basis and using Article 142 to create it is impermissible, as it would let the judiciary replace the Governor or President and violate separation of powers.
  - No Mandatory SC Advice for President: SC clarified that the President is not mandatorily required to seek the Court's opinion under Article 143 for every reserved bill, and that decisions under Article 201 can be taken based on the President's own constitutional satisfaction.

Way Forward

Make the Appointment Process Consultative
- The Chief Minister of the concerned State should be formally consulted before the Governor is appointed.
- The selection process should prioritise persons of eminence, integrity and constitutional understanding who have remained detached from active party politics.
- Persons involved in recent political activity should not ordinarily be appointed as Governors, particularly in States governed by rival political parties.
Provide Greater Security of Tenure
- The five-year tenure under Article 156 should ordinarily be respected.
- Premature removal or transfer should be based on compelling constitutional reasons rather than a change of government at the Union level.
- Reasons for premature removal should be recorded to prevent the pleasure doctrine from becoming an instrument of political control.
Codify the Exercise of Discretionary Powers
- A comprehensive constitutional manual should specify the principles governing government formation, floor tests, summoning of the legislature, reservation of Bills and reports under Article 356.
- The Governor should exercise discretion only where the Constitution expressly or necessarily permits it.
- Written reasons should accompany important discretionary decisions, making them open to constitutional scrutiny.
Establish Clear Rules for Government Formation
- In a hung Assembly, the Governor should follow a publicly defined and consistent order of preference while inviting a leader to form the government.
- The claimant should be required to demonstrate majority support on the floor of the House within a reasonable and uniform period.
- Subjective assessment by the Governor, private headcounts and selective reliance on letters of support should not replace a floor test.
Use Floor Tests Only on Objective Material
- A floor test should be directed only where credible and objective material indicates that the Council of Ministers has lost the confidence of the Assembly.
- Internal disagreements within a political party should not automatically be treated as loss of legislative confidence.
- The Governor should not use the floor-test power to resolve intra-party disputes or alter political alignments.
Ensure Timely Disposal of State Bills
- Governors should act upon Bills under Article 200 without prolonged and unexplained delay.
- The available constitutional options—assent, return, reservation or withholding of assent—should be exercised through a clear and reasoned decision.
- Where a Bill is returned, the Governor should identify the constitutional or legal concerns requiring reconsideration.
- Reservation for presidential consideration should be used only where substantial constitutional grounds exist, not as a routine method of delaying State legislation.
Restrict the Use of Article 356
- The Governor’s report should contain verified, objective and relevant material demonstrating an actual breakdown of constitutional machinery.
- Political instability, intra-party dissent or difficulty in government formation should first be resolved through legislative processes.
- Majority should ordinarily be determined through a floor test before recommending President’s Rule.
- Article 356 should remain a measure of last resort rather than an instrument for displacing an elected State government.
Review the Governor’s Role as University Chancellor
- Since the position of Chancellor arises from State legislation rather than directly from the Constitution, States should reconsider whether it should automatically be attached to the office of Governor.
- University appointments and administration should be entrusted to independent, transparent and professionally constituted academic bodies.
- Where the Governor continues as Chancellor, the extent of authority and the respective roles of the Chancellor and State government should be clearly defined by law.
Avoid Public Political Confrontation
- Constitutional disagreements between the Governor and the Council of Ministers should ordinarily be addressed through written communication, consultation and confidential institutional dialogue.
- Governors should avoid public political commentary, repeated press confrontations and criticism of ordinary government policy.
- Chief Ministers should similarly respect the constitutional dignity of the office and respond through formal channels.
Code of Conduct
- A code based on the Constitution, Supreme Court judgments and the recommendations of the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions should guide gubernatorial conduct.
- It should cover political neutrality, public statements, communication with the Chief Minister, government formation, floor tests, assent to Bills and reports under Article 356.
- Compliance with the code should be periodically reviewed through the Inter-State Council.
Promote Cooperative Federalism
- The Governor should act as a constructive constitutional bridge between the Union and the State rather than as a supervisory agent of the Union government.
- The Union government should refrain from using appointment, transfer or removal of Governors as a means of influencing State politics.

The solution lies neither in abolishing the office nor in expanding its discretionary authority. The Governor must be repositioned as a politically neutral constitutional head who counsels the elected government, safeguards constitutional processes and intervenes only in exceptional circumstances. Transparent appointments, secure tenure, codified discretion, timely action on Bills and respect for the elected State executive are essential for transforming Raj Bhavan from a centre of federal conflict into an institution of constitutional balance and cooperative federalism.

Sample Mains Question

Examine the major constitutional and political controversies associated with the office of Governor in India. (15 Marks, 250 Words)
“The Governor was conceived as a neutral constitutional head but has frequently been perceived as an instrument of central intervention in State politics.” Critically examine. (15 Marks, 250 Words)

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